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circumstances, that his performance shall not be recorded without his consent;
that his performance shall not be broadcast without his consent; that, if he broadcasts, his broadcast shall not be recorded without his consent; that if he records
his performance, his recordings shall not be broadcast without his consent; that
his recordings shall not be used upon the sound tract of a film without his consent?
An American writer has recently stated that it is usually conceded that the
performing artist is without remedy against the illicit reproduction of his works
and argued that rights could and should be given him by making use of the familiar
common law concepts of literary property, unfair competition, the right of pri2
vacy and defamation.
The same writer later had an opportunity to present his views to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 8 That court, asserting that the problems involved
in the case had never been presented to ar English or American court and that
they challenged the vaunted genius of the law to adapt itself to new social and
industrial conditions and to the progress of science and invention, decided that
"performers-in this case an orchestra-have an enforceable right' in their artistic interpretation of the work of a composer," and afforded certain protection
to this right by making use of the concepts of "a common law property right," 6
unfair competition 6 and the right of privacy. 7 The anxiety of the court to recognize and protect the rights of a performing artist was so great that it brushed
aside in a cavalier fashion certain objections which would otherwise have prevented their recognition and protection in the particular case. 8

W. H.

HITCHLER.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENNSYLVANIA'S PRISON ESCAPE ACT
The constitutionality of Pennsylvania's escape statute, which has operated
without contest for more than 75 years, was recently upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in tho case of Pennsylvania, ex. rel. Sullivan v. Ashe,
82 L. Ed. 58 (1937).
The statute challenged in this case was that portion of the Act of 1860,
P. L. 382, Section 3 (18 PS 251) which provides that:
2

Maurice J. Speiser in an Addendum to his translation of Homberg's book.
3Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631, (1937).
4The court did not attempt to answer all of the questions previously stated in this note. It
enjoined the unauthorized broadcast of a recording of the artists' performance.
5
6 The opinion of the majority.
The opinion of the majority.
7
The concurring opinion of Justice Maxey.
8E. g., a stockholder was permitted to enforce the rights of a corporation altho the court said
"It is the corporation, the orchestra organization, which alone is entitled to assert and enforce the
right of property in its renditions."
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1 . . . . if any prisoner imprisoned in any penitentiary ....
upon a conviction for a criminal offense . . . . shall break such
penitentiary . . . . such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction of said offense, shall be sentenced to undergo
an imprisonment, to commence from the expiration of his original
sentence, of tht like nature, and for a period of time not exceeding
the original sentence, by virtue of which he was imprisoned, when
he so broke prison and escaped .... "
The case arose as a result of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed with
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The petitioner, who had been sentenced ta
the penitentiary for a term of three to six years for breaking and entering with
intcnt to commit a felony, escaped from the penitentiary, was apprehended, and
was sentenced, under the above quoted statutory provision, for a term of from
three to six years to be computed from the expiration of his original sentence.
The petitioner obj'ected to this sentence, contending that the statute violated
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States in that it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
He based this contention upon the argument that prisoners escaping under
identical circumstances might be subjected to different sentences, depending
merely upon the duration of the sentences being served at the time of the escape. He pointed out that he was accompanied in his escape by another prisoner
who was also apprehended but who received a sentence of only from one t.
two years because that was the extent of his original sentence.
Both the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania [325 Pa. 305 (1937)) and the
Supreme Court of the United States concluded that the statute was constitutional.
These decisions are undoubtedly sound and are based upon the well established
principle that violators of the law may be classified, for the purposes of punishment, upon the basis of their past criminal records. [Graham v. State of West
Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. Ed. 917 (1912)].
It is interesting to note, however, that the Supreme Courts of three other
states had declared analogous escape statutes to be unconstitutional. [State v,.
Levin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 Pac. 168 (1894); In Re Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102
Pac. 374 (1909); and State v. Johnsey, 46 Okla. Crim. Appeals, 287 Pac. 729
(1930) ]. On the other hand, there were no appellate court decisions upholding
the constitutionality of such statutes.
In the case of State v. Levin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 Pac. 168 (1894), there was
involved an escape statute which provided that any person escaping from
prison should receive a sentence equal to the original sentence, to commence
from the conviction for the escape, and the time previously served should not
be counted in computing the sentence for escape. The Court said:
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"So it may happen under this section that two men attempting or
effecting an escape from the penitentiary on the same day in concert
under precisely the same circumstances and with exactly Lqual guilt
would receive wholly different punishment. If one had been confined but for a day while the other who might have been confined
for 20 years would be sentenced to a further confinement for that
number of years. Is not this, in effect, not merely placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, but in fact punishing
him twice? Can this be said to be an impartial administration of
justice? Can it be said to be affording to all individuals the equal
protection of the laws?"
As an answer to these rhetorical questions the Court held that the statute
was invalid as a violation of the Constitutions of Kansas and the United States.
In In Re Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 Pac. 374 (1909), the statute
before the Court provided that a prisoner escaping from the state prison should
be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term equal in length
to the term being served at the time of such escape, and that the second term
of imprisonment should commence from the time the prisoner would otherwise
have been discharged.
The Court held that this act violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States stating:
"This classification is not natural, but arbitrary. To justify a classification of grades of crime, there must appear some good and valid
reason why the classification should be made as made."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that the conclusions reached in
these two cases could not be followed (p. 310) and the Supreme Court of the
United States indicated that the statutes involved therein differed essentially
from the Pennsylvania statute. (L. Ed. p. 59).
The difference, which the Supreme Court of the United States had in mina,
between the Pennsylvania statute and the statutes of Kansas and Idaho evidently
lay in the fact that the Pennsylvania act provides for a punishment not exceedix&
the original sentence, while the latter acts allowed the sentencing judge no
discretion in fixing the punishment.
In view of the fact that the decisions in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Ashe, supra, were based upon the principle that the past criminal record of law
violators is a proper basis for classification, it is difficult to see why the presence
or absence of the element of discretion should be the controlling consideration.
It might be noted, nevertheless, that the Court, in the case of In Re Mallon,
supra, made the following comments upon that phase of the question:

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

"It is argued by the Attorney General that a critical examination
of this statute will lead to the conclusion, that the legislature, in
prescribing the punishment for escape, intended to fix the maximum
penalty to be inflicted at not to exceed the term which the convict
was serving at the time of his escape, and to leave to the discretion
of the trial court the punishment not exceeding the maximum ....
To give this construction to this statute it seems to us would be to
legislate upon the subject, and supply what we might conceive to
be necessary in order to sustain the constitutionality of the statute.

If this be the rule which would guide courts in determining the
constitutionality of a statute, thie court would have little difficulty
in sustaining all legislative acts, because they might supply all such
defects or alterations by judicial legislation. We, however, must
take this statute as it reads, and when so taken, the punishment is
fixed arbitrarily, and is not in any sense left to the discretion of the
trial court .

. . ."

(16 Idaho 737 at 749, 750, 102 Pac. 374, at

377, 378). (Italics added).
The statute involved in the case of State v. Johnsey, 387 Pac. 729, 46
Okla. Cr. App. 233 (1930) was very similar to the Pennsylvania act. That
statute provided that any person who escaped from or broke the state prison,
should upon conviction be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding
double the term for which he was originally sentenced.
Notwithstanding the discretionary features of the act before it, the Court
of Criminal Appeal of Oklahoma, relying upon In Re Mallon, supra, held
that the classification set up in the act was unreasonable and that the act violated
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
Because the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, upholding the
Pennsylvania Statute, was felt to be in conflict with this decision of the Oklahoma Court, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a writ of certiorari
for the purpose of reviewing the question, and, as indicated above, affirmed the
views expressed by the Pennsylvania Court.
William Wood.

TRANSMISSIBILITY

OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN PENNSYLVANIA

It is the purpose of this note to discuss the extent to which Pennsylvania
will permit the alienation of contingent future interests. Each method of alienation or transfer will lye treated separately to discover what progress has been

